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In this paper, we propose a new methodology to jointly estimate market power and the 
importance of sunk capital extending the work of Hall (1988) and Roeger (1995). We 
then apply this new technique to the European electricity industry using firm level data 
for the period 1994-1999, and analyze the impact of the 1996 European directive to 
liberalize electricity markets. We find that the average price cost margin has declined 
from 0.29 in 1994 to 0.22 in 1999. Moreover, the magnitude of the decline is linked to 
firm size: the largest firms have experienced a larger percentage fall. The variable cost 
parameter has increased from 0.36 in 1994 to 0.56 in 1999. The main reason of the 
change is the switch of the relationship between real labor productivity and the share of 
variable capital. Our results therefore document a more competitive electricity market 
and a more flexible and more efficient use of capital. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Following the seminal work by Hall (1986, 1988), a literature has emerged that aims at 
estimating the markup of price over marginal cost. This method is based on the simple 
idea that the Solow residual only provides an unbiased measure of total factor 
productivity (TFP) growth under the assumption of perfect competition. The bias due to 
imperfect competition can be shown to be proportional to the markup, allowing 
therefore its estimation. However, the method has been criticized for yielding high 
estimates. In this paper, we argue that these high estimates can partly be explained by 
the presence of fixed capital. We provide a new methodology that jointly estimates the 
markup and the importance of fixed capital. We then apply our technique to a firm-
level dataset from the European electricity industry. 
 
Studying the evolution of the markup and the lack of capital flexibility is particularly 
relevant for the European electricity industry. On the one hand, bringing more 
competition is the main motivation behind the creation of a single market for electricity 
advocated by the European Commission. On the other hand, recent technological 
advancements have permitted the adoption of more flexible production technologies. 
We would therefore expect markups to decline and capital to become more flexible. 
Our paper tests these two assumptions. It also stresses the importance of controlling for 
fixed capital to provide an economic interpretation of the size of markups. 
 
The intuition of our methodology is the following: (1) both the primal and the dual 
Solow residuals with input shares weighted by revenue mismeasure TFP growth in the 
presence of market power and the bias inflicted is proportional to the markup, which 
can then be estimated (Roeger, 1995); (2) primal and dual Solow residuals with cost 
(instead of revenue) weights are unaffected by the presence of markups (Hall, 1990) but 
only measure TFP growth correctly in the absence of fixed capital. The bias in TFP 
growth measurement is proportional to the share of fixed capital and this allows us to 
estimate it. Combining these two ideas forms the core of our analysis. 
 
  2Our methodology differs from the (recent) usual practice in the estimation of market 
power in the electricity sector. Following Joskow and Schmalensee (1983), Wolfram 
(1999) argues that, because the production technology in the electricity sector is 
straightforward and well understood, marginal costs can be directly computed on the 
basis of the cost of fuel (specific to the type of plant) and the efficiency of 
transformation. She applies this technique to the new electricity market in England and 
Wales during 18 months between 1992 and 1994. She then compares prices to marginal 
cost and finds highly variable estimates of the Lerner index between 0.19 and 0.24, She 
also finds that the link between the Lerner index and quantities supplied increased after 
March 1994. Borenstein, Bushnell and Wolak (2002) follow a similar procedure but 
estimate price in an efficient perfectly competitive market. They then measure the 
extent of market power in the California electricity market before and during the crisis 
of summer 2000 by comparing actual and estimated prices. They find significant 
departure from competitive pricing during the summer months when demand is high 
and an increase in the Lerner index. They conclude that 59% of the four-fold electricity 
expenditures increase between the summer 1999 and the summer 2000 can be attributed 
to market power. We provide an alternative way to estimate the Lerner index 
maintaining the hypothesis that marginal cost is unobservable and using public data that 
are easy to obtain. The dataset that we use provides yearly firm (and not plant) level 
data. This contrasts with the data available in the other studies mentioned: e.g. Wolfram 
used bids submitted every 30 minutes on the English & Wales electricity market. 
However, we are not able to consider the timing of market power along the day and 
with demand along the year. Rather we estimate an average Lerner index for a given 
year. 
  
We find that the price cost margin (PCM) declined by 13% from 0.29 in 1994 to 0.22 in 
1999. More importantly, this reduction has been exercised mostly by a change in the 
relationship between size and the PCM. Moreover, we find that the share of fixed costs 
in capital has diminished considerably after 1996, what might indicate that firms have 
more flexibility and make a better use of their existing capital. This evolution can be 
linked to technological change, unbundling of generation and transmission or to a 
  3strategy of reorganization of the capital stock leading to a reduction of fixed costs. The 
level of our estimates is comparable to the figures obtained in other studies (see e.g. 
Wolfram, 1999). While the PCM decrease can be interpreted as a sign of increased 
competition, the levels remain high, especially for the largest firms in countries that 
liberalized the electricity market more recently. In view of the existing evidence from 
countries where liberalization is more advanced, our paper would tend to advocate 
prudence in the way liberalization takes place and the European electricity market 
architecture is designed. 
  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our empirical methodology. 
Section 3 describes the firm level dataset that we use for the estimation. Section 4 




We assume that electricity production can be modeled within the neoclassical 
production framework, i. e. the technology of firm i in year t can be described as: 
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where output Q is produced with labor N, materials M and capital K,  and where a 
certain fraction of the total capital stock is sunk (K
s)
 4. F(.) is homogeneous of degree 1 
in variable capital  , materials and labor. With this specification, declining costs are 
generated by the presence of fixed capital.   is defined here as the type of capital 
which is not adjusted within a period to current period demand and cost conditions, 
while   is the fraction of total capital which is adjusted to demand and cost 
conditions in the current period without friction. Data availability precludes an 




                                                 
4 To keep notation simple, we omit firm and time subscripts in the derivations. 
  4however, we will be able to estimate the share of fixed capital by fully exploiting the 
implications of the production model.  
 




































For estimation, we postulate a simple markup model by allowing price cost margins to 
vary systematically with firm size. We allow for a term v to capture unobserved 
heterogeneity. 
 
(4)   i i i v Q + + = 1 0 β β β . 
 
The share of fixed capital is also firm specific and can vary systematically with the 
level of economic activity of a given firm over time as well as with respect to firm size 
over the cross sectional dimension. Unfortunately this share is not directly observable 
and we need to find an approximation for s. We use labor productivity as a proxy for s. 
We show in Appendix A that this can be derived endogenously under various 
assumptions regarding the technology. As s is bounded between 0 and 1, we assume a 
logistic function to describe the relationship between s and Q/N: 
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where u is an error term.  
 
In the following, we show how cost and revenue based Solow residuals are affected by 
the presence of markups ( 1 µ >  or  0 β > ) and fixed costs (s<1). This forms the basis 
for our estimation.  
 
2.1 Interpreting Solow residuals with imperfect competition and sunk capital 
 
Consistent measurement of individual factor contributions to output and prices under 
alternative market structures requires consistent measurements of marginal products. 
Since marginal products cannot be observed directly, one can make use of first order 
conditions from profit maximization. However, real factor prices can be used directly 
only under perfect competition. Generally, factor prices underestimate the true marginal 
product proportionally to the markup of prices over marginal cost. As shown by Hall, 
this factor can be extracted from conventionally measured Solow residuals. The FOCs 





































where W is the price of labor, PM is the price of materials and R is the price of capital. 
 
First, we show the bias inflicted on Solow residuals with factor contributions weighted 
by their respective revenue shares. In a second step, we discuss another weighting 
  6scheme, namely cost weights, and show that these measures are ideally suited for 
extracting the share of fixed capital. 
 
2.2 Primal and Dual Solow Residuals with Revenue Shares 
 
Logarithmic differentiation of the production function (1) and using the FOC’s (6a-c) 
together with Euler's law allows us to write the change of output as a weighted average 
of the change in inputs plus technological progress as follows
5
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Note that, under imperfect competition, the output contribution of individual production 
factors exceeds their respective revenue shares by the term 1/(1-β ). 
 
Similarly, logarithmic differentiation of marginal cost and using Shepard's lemma 
allows us to write the change of prices as a weighted average of factor prices minus the 
rate of technical progress. The factor price weights are again the factor shares adjusted 
for 1/(1-β ).  
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Using these relationships, we can define the primal and dual Solow residuals and see 
how they are related to TFP and a markup component. There is, however, one 
complication, namely the unobservability of K
v and its annual growth rate. The factor 
share of variable capital does not pose a problem since, under our technological 
assumptions, it can be represented as 
 
                                                 
5 We use the following notation:   denotes the log difference of the variable X.  x ∆
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Using Eq. (5), we can write growth rate of variable capital as follows: 
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sx = ε  is the elasticity of the variable capital 
share with respect to labor productivity. 
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Using (7) and (8), these two productivity measures can be written as weighted averages 
of true TFP and a markup plus a fixed capital component: 
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Both residuals are functions of the markup level but not the level of fixed costs. The 
dual Solow residual is unaffected by fixed costs and the primal measure only responds 
to changes in s.  
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2.3 Primal and Dual Solow Residuals with Cost-Based Shares 
 
The use of cost weighted TFP measures was suggested by Hall (1990) as a way of 
avoiding the bias inflicted by imperfect competition on the measurement of the rate of 
technical progress. In this section, we show that these alternative measures are indeed 
fairly robust with respect to the presence of imperfect competition. However, they turn 
out to be more sensitive to the presence of fixed costs in a fashion which can be 
exploited for extracting s from cost weighted Solow residuals. Since, under constant 
returns to scale, we have: 
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We can simply rewrite Eq. (7) and (8) with variable cost shares: 
 



































From (7´) and (8´), we notice that the presence of fixed costs creates a similar 
measurement problem as the presence of markups for the measurement of revenue 
weighted Solow residuals. Ideally, the contribution of factors and their prices to output 
and output prices should be weighted with their respective shares in variable costs. Like 
in the case above - where we do not observe revenue minus profits - we do not observe 
total cost less fixed costs.  
 
Therefore, conventionally measured cost weighted Solow residuals (  and  ), 
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will also inflict a bias which is proportional to the share of fixed capital. To see this, 
simply use the definition of variable cost 
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Substituting this expression into (16) and (17) allows us after some simple 
manipulations to represent the two cost weighted TFP measures as follows: 
 












C ) ( ) ( )) ( 1 ( 
 








R ) ( )) ( 1 (.  
 
As can be seen from (19) and (20), both residuals are ideal measures for the rate of 
technical progress only in the absence of sunk capital. In the presence of sunk capital, 
both measures would indicate a positive rate of technical progress also in situations 
where output rises more strongly than total capital and fall in prices exceeds the fall in 
capital cost. This is intuitively plausible. Assume a firm only produces with a fixed 
capital share equal to one. In this case, the primal residual would be biased upward with 
an output expansion generated entirely by an increase in variable inputs, because the 
contribution of labor and materials to changes in output are underestimated and, 
therefore, a part of the output change is wrongly attributed to the technology residual. 
Similarly, there are circumstances in which the dual residual would indicate technical 
progress when in fact there is none. Assume, for example, an increase in capital cost. 
With marginal cost pricing, this would not affect output prices and therefore the dual 
  10residual would wrongly attribute the increase in real capital cost to the technology 
residual. 
 
2.4 Identifying the size of markups and the share of fixed capital 
 
The four Solow residuals as represented by equations (13), (14), (19) and (20) provide 
information about sunk costs and markups. The econometric problem consists in 
estimating s and β , and control for changes in technology. This is a problem since the 
regressors are likely to be correlated with the technology term. A comparison of the 
primal and dual residuals shows that the technology term can be eliminated altogether 
by simply subtracting the corresponding primal and dual residuals from each other: 
 
(19)  [] () ( ) ( 1 ) ( )
M
RR it it it it
it it it it it it it it sx it it
it it it it
WN P M
SRQ SRP q p k r x x
PQ PQ
ββ −= ∆ + ∆ − ∆ + ∆ + − −− ∆ ε  
(20)  [] [] 1( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
CC it it it it
it it it it it it it it sx it it
it it
RK RK
SRQ SRP s x q p k r s x x x
CC
ε − = − ∆ +∆ − ∆ +∆ + ∆  
 
It follows from these expressions that the primal and dual residuals are systematically 
related to the change in nominal output relative to the value of capital services. The 
difference is roughly proportional to the size of the markup in the case of revenue 
weights and to the share of fixed capital in the case of cost weights. Only under perfect 
competition and fully flexible adjustment of capital would both sets of primal and dual 
residuals be identical. These two equations can be estimated consistently provided the 
measurement errors are uncorrelated with the nominal capital output ratio. Roeger 
(1995) provides a discussion of the measurement error issue. Here additional 
measurement errors arise because β  may have a stochastic component and s can be 
measured with error as discussed above. We regard the bias inflicted by these additional 
measurement errors as small. In the case of β  we control for output variations along 
the time dimension by allowing markups to vary with output. Stochastic variations of 
β  along the cross section can only cause a bias to the extent in which “level 
differences” in β  across individual firms would be correlated with the “growth rate” in 
  11their respective nominal capital output ratios. There is no reason to expect such a 
relationship. A similar argument applies to the error in measuring the variable capital 
share. Comparing the two relationships also shows that some cross equation restrictions 
hold between the two equations because the change in the fixed capital share also enters 
the revenue based TFP difference. Therefore it is useful to estimate both relationships 
jointly as a system of two non linear equations with the four parameters to be estimated: 
0 β ,  1 β , s0 and s1. Our test concerning the economic impact of the liberalization of the 
electricity market in European countries consists in estimating Eq. (19) and (20) over 
the sub-periods: 1994-1996 and 1997-1999. We consider 1996 as the last year before 




Our dataset provides financial information on the 500 largest firms active in the 
electricity sector in Europe and is extracted from Amadeus. The data reported included 
operating revenue, cost of employees, cost of materials, capital, depreciation and 
employment. By definition, we have more observations in countries that have opened to 
competition or that have allowed existence of several firms on the market historically. 
The bulk of our sample is therefore compose d  o f  G e r m a n  f i r m s ;  w e  a l s o  h a v e  a  
reasonable amount of firms from Austria, Spain and Finland, but a very limited amount 
of firms from France, Belgium and Italy. The quality of the data for the other countries 
did not allow us to include them in our analysis. 
  
We selected all firms involved in the 3-digit NACE Rev. 1 industry 401 "production 
and distribution of electricity". The raw data did not allow us to make a difference 
between firms present in the distribution sector and those involved in generation. 
However, we looked one by one to exclude firms not present in generation. 
 
We have also cleaned the data to make sure that we have comparable firms. We only 
consider observations where the share of material costs and the share of wages in 
turnover is larger than 0.01 and smaller than 1, and when the absolute value of nominal 
  12growth of output and input is smaller or equal than 0.6 (this means that we ruled out 
large mergers in the first year of their operation). We end up with a sample of 165 firms 
providing 570 observations, an average of 3.45 observations per firm. Table 1 provides 
the summary statistics. 
 
Table 1: Summary statistics 
 
Variable mean  Std.  dev. 
Output (in millions 1995 Euros)  790.5  2569 
Employment 2,397  11,139 
αN 0.16 0.08 
αM 0.53 0.14 
δ 0.07  0.03 
∆log(PQ) 0.0003  0.01 
∆logPMM -0.025  0.138 





Table 2 provides the results of the estimation of our system of non linear equations (19) 
and (20). We find evidence of substantial heterogeneity in the price cost margins and in 
the share of variable costs. Price cost margins increase with the size of the firm, and the 




  13Table 2: results 
 
  1994-1996 1997-1999 
β0 0.195








** (0.711)  2.252
** (0.475) 
s1 1.361
** (0.124)  0.448
** (0.080) 
Note: standard errors in parentheses; ** indicates statistical significance at the 5% critical level 
 
Figure 1: the change in the relationship between price cost margins and size 
 
q





Note:   iavpcm=individual average price cost margin for the period 1994-1996;  
iavpcm2=individual average price cost margin for the period 1997-1999 
 
The evolution of our parameters is interesting to note. The (quantity weighted) average 
price cost margin has declined from 0.29 in 1994 to 0.22 in 1999. However, the 
magnitude of the decline is linked to the size of the firm: the largest firms have suffered 
from a larger percentage fall. Figure 1 shows the switch in the PCM-size relationship. 
  14One way to interpret this decline is that incumbents have faced market share losses as 
competition at the national level has increased. Moreover, there has been a decline in 
the constant component of the PCM, reinforcing the previous effect.  
 
On the other hand, the (quantity weighted) average variable cost parameter has 
increased from 0.36 in 1994 to 0.56 in 1999. Again, the main reason of the change is 
the switch of the relationship between real labor productivity and the share of variable 
capital. Figure 2 shows that there has been an upward switch, especially for low and 
medium-productivity firms, while high productivity firms have hardly made any 
change. This suggests that firms with average or low productivity have adopted more 
flexible production structure. 
 
Figure 2: The change in the variable capital parameter  
 
logrlp





Note:   iavvc=individual average share of variable cost for the period 1994-1996;  
iavvc2=individual average share of variable cost for the period 1997-1999 
 
  15Altogether, our findings indicate a dramatic transformation of the European electricity 
industry. Pricing has become more competitive and, in particular, PCMs have become 
less sensitive to the size of the firm. At the same time, the share of fixed capital has 
diminished, what can be interpreted in various ways. First, technological change and 
regulatory change have allowed entry of new plants with less fixed capital. Second, 
unbundling has freed resources for generation. Third, firms have restructured and 
adopted more flexible production techniques. We are unable to determine the exact 
proportion that can be attributed to liberalization, but, in any case, this paper documents 
a positive evolution of the industry. 
 
Our results are robust when we allow the PCM to have a country specific component to 
capture potential differences in the regulatory regime. There was no significant effect.  
 
We do a further robustness check by observing that under the two extreme opposite 
assumptions of perfectly fixed capital and full capital adjustment within the period of 
observation, the markup can be estimated on the basis of the revenue weighted Solow 
residual only. Though this assumption is likely to inflict a bias for the markup estimate, 
it nevertheless seems to be a useful exercise if one is interested in the change of the 
markup after liberalization since one would not expect the liberalization to affect the 
size of the bias and we therefore expect to obtain a lower estimate in the second period. 
As can be seen from Table 3 we obtain a reduction in the same order of magnitude. 
 
Table 3: results  
 
  1994-1996 1997-1999 
β0 0.326







Note: standard errors in parentheses; ** indicates statistical significance at the 5% critical level 
 
Note also that the level of markups is substantially higher if we do not control for 
capital fixity. This is consistent with our previous hypothesis that the capital cost can 
  16partly be adjusted to current economic conditions, since in this case we expect the 





In this paper, we have developed a new methodology to jointly estimate market power 
and the importance of sunk capital extending the work of Hall (1988) and Roeger 
(1995). The analysis is based on the simple idea that we can exploit the properties of 
the cost share weighted and the revenue share weighted Solow residuals, which are 
affected differently by the presence of fixed capital and imperfect competition.  
 
We have applied our methodology to the European electricity industry using firm level 
data for the period 1994-1999, and analyzed the impact of the 1996 European directive 
to liberalize electricity markets. As predicted by our theoretical model, the differences 
between the two sets of Solow residuals are systematically related to indicators of 
markups and of fixed capital.  
 
We find that the average price cost margin has declined from 0.29 in 1994 to 0.22 in 
1999. Moreover, the magnitude of the decline is linked to firm size: the largest firms 
have experienced a larger percentage fall. On the other hand, the variable cost 
parameter has increased from 0.36 in 1994 to 0.56 in 1999. The main reason of the 
change is the switch of the relationship between real labor productivity and the share of 
variable capital. Our results therefore document a more competitive electricity market 
and a more flexible and more efficient use of capital. 
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Along the time series dimension we ask the question: how do variations of Q over time 
affect s and Q/N for given technological parameters( )
S K b a , , . Since   and N are used 























which shows that along the time series dimension there is a positive relation between 
labor productivity and the share of fixed capital. At the cross sectional dimension we 
have to take into account that because of (country) specific market conditions, 
regulations and transport costs different technologies coexist, i. e. a, b, and   vary 
over individual firms. Assume there exists a high and low fixed cost technology 
, which can be characterized by the triple  , with  . 
For   to be cost minimizing at some level of output it must be the case 
 must hold, where N(.) is some norm of the vector (a,b). In other 
words,   has higher fixed costs but lower variable costs. It follows immediately that 
there exists a level of output Q* such that total cost of   are smaller for   and 
larger for  . Suppose both technologies are operated in some market. For  , we 
know that the maximum level of labor productivity is given by: 
s K
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Since both, labor productivity and the variable capital share are increasing functions of 




































Notice, this inequality only holds for sufficiently large levels of output (Q**), 
depending on the production parameters a and b. Therefore across the cross sectional 
dimension the relationship between labor productivity and a variable capital share only 
holds with an error. 
 
                                                                                                                                                
6 With more general technologies changes in relative factor prices could be an additional factor affecting 
the capital share. In this paper we ignore this effect. 
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